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1. Introduction 
Interest in the links between economic performance and the political environment has recently been 
renewed. Economists have started to take seriously the possibility that political instability and 
unrest can have a large and lasting impact on the real economy. In part this is a by-product of the 
renaissance in growth theory, and much of the empirical work uses the cross-country panel data 
constructed by the World Bank. Time-varying data on political factors is seldom available on a 
monthly or quarterly basis, so the application of time-series econometric techniques is very rare. 
  In particular, attention has been drawn to the economic consequences of civil wars, and the 
factors that determine the magnitude of the economic costs that a war generates. For example, 
Collier (1999) develops a theoretical framework in which a key feature is the adjustment of the 
capital stock through capital flight. Conflict reduces the productivity of domestic capital and 
increases (expected) physical depreciation rates. Domestic investors will relocate their capital 
abroad, leading to a reduction in domestic output. The model is tested on data for all civil wars 
since 1960. After long civil wars (when the capital stock has had time to reach its lower steady 
state) the economy recovers rapidly, whereas after short wars it continues to decline.  
A related body of literature pursues the empirical link between capital flight and a wide 
range of indicators of civil conflict and unrest. Indicators used in panel data regressions include the 
incidence of political protests, major government changes and civil rights indices. Papers taking this 
type of approach include Tabellini (1988), Lensink et al. (1998), Le and Zak (2001) and Ndikumana 
and Boyce (2002). There appears to be a consensus that cross-country variations in political stability 
do account for a substantial part of the variations in capital flows.  
More generally, there is a body of work investigating the links between countries’ long run 
growth rates and indices of political rights, political instability and violence. Alesina and Perotti 
(1994) survey many of the papers outlining these ideas; recent additions to the literature include 
Easterly and Levine (1997) and Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998). Different papers find different 
socio-political indicators to be significant in explaining variations in economic performance across 
countries, but there is a consensus that a substantial fraction of the variation is to be explained by 
the quality of a country’s polity.
1
1 There is a closely related literature examining cross-country variations in gross investment performance. A paper by 
Alesina and Perotti (1993) explains such variations by using a "sociopolitical instability index" constructed using principal 
components analysis. The important factors in the index are indicators of the absence of democracy and the incidence of 
political violence. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and de Haan and Siermann (1996) discover a negative cross-country 
correlation between the investment-GDP ratio and indices of political freedom. 2
  These studies provide a wealth of international evidence on the links between political 
instability and conflict and the macro-economy. However, the use of panel data does embody 
certain limitations. Firstly, the slope coefficients on political variables in cross-country regressions 
should be interpreted as the mean effect on economic performance of a certain political 
characteristic, across all the countries in the sample.
2 We cannot say much about individual 
countries, or individual types of countries. Secondly, the panel data sets are based on annual data, so 
they cannot be used to explore the dynamics of the interaction between the political and economic 
variables. For example, to what extent do short-term variations in the level of conflict lead to 
changes in short-term capital flows? If conflict intensity increases, how much of a lag is there in the 
capital flow response? Here the potential value of econometric evidence on individual countries 
using time-series data – were it available – would be very high.
3
  One other country for which time-series data on indicators of conflict intensity do exist, and in 
which these indicators have exhibited a large degree of variability in recent years, is Israel.
4 In this 
paper we will use Israeli time-series data to investigate one link in the chain linking economy and 
polity. If Israeli investors are sensitive to the risks inherent in a volatile political environment, then the 
fraction of their portfolio made up by domestic assets should be sensitive to prevailing political 
conditions. In other words, the magnitude of capital flight should have an explanation that is partly 
political. Another advantage of using time series in this context is that it becomes feasible to address 
the potential endogeneity of the political variables. Variations in economic conditions might impact on 
the level of violence, so identifying the direction of causality will be an important aspect of the 
analysis.  
  However, the aim of this paper is not just to provide some time-series evidence to complement 
existing cross-section work. Econometric modeling of the impact of political instability and violence 
on the economy can also inform public policy. It can provide an estimate of the size of the “peace 
dividend”, the magnitude of the economic benefits that are likely to ensue from an end to, or at least 
reduction in, political instability. The size of this expected dividend ought to be one factor in 
determining the amount of resources devoted to achieving political stability by the state (and also by 
2 One serious problem with the panel data regressions is the difficulty in producing an unbiased estimate of this mean 
value. See Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
3 To date there is (as far as we know) only one paper that looks at the links between political instability, investment and 
capital flight within a time-series context: Fedderke and Liu (2002), who use South African data. Proceeding from the 
assumption that changes in the South African polity are weakly exogenous to capital flight indicators, they find that 
capital flight is positively associated with an index of political instability. Reductions in stability lead to more capital 
flight. 
4 The term “Israel” will be used to denote the geographical area currently governed from Jerusalem, i.e. the State of Israel 
within its 1948 borders plus the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. All place names are purely geographical and 
have no geopolitical implications. 3
the international community).
5 Determining the amount of capital that investors locate outside of Israel 
because of the violence – capital that could be productively located within the economy, possibly at a 
higher rate of return – is one element of this accounting process. 
In the next two sections, we review the political and economic time-series data for Israel that 
will be used in the econometric analysis in sections 4-5. 
2. The Intifada and Indicators of Political Instability in Israel 
As a consequence of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel currently governs territories outside its 1948 
borders, including the West Bank, i.e., territory west of the River Jordan but east of the 1948 border, 
and the area around the city of Gaza. The majority of the population in these areas is made up of 
Palestinian Arabs, many of whom contest the legitimacy of Israeli rule and Jewish settlement of the 
territories. In December 1987 there was a sudden uprising (the first Intifada) among Palestinians in 
these areas (Peretz, 1990). The uprising consisted of strikes and public demonstrations, which often 
escalated to the point where protestors were shot dead by members of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); 
later there was an increase in the number politically motivated assassinations and attacks on Israeli 
targets by Palestinian paramilitary groups, particularly Hamas. The uprising continued up to September 
1993, when the Israeli Government signed an agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(the Oslo Peace Accord). This agreement included PLO recognition of the State of Israel and Israeli 
recognition of the need for Palestinian self-government in at least part of the West Bank and Gaza 
areas. The political structures envisaged by the Oslo Peace Accord have not yet been fully 
implemented, and the political violence and instability have not ceased. Over the 15 years since the 
start of the first Intifada the magnitude of political tensions and violence has varied considerably. 
Towards the end of 2000 there was another upsurge in the intensity of the conflict that has become 
known as the “second” Intifada. The purpose of our paper is to construct a macro-econometric model 
that uses this variation to estimate the extent to which the political instability has impacted on Israelis’ 
decisions about where to locate their capital wealth. 
In creating time-series measures of the intensity of the conflict, we aim to capture the factors 
that determine Israeli investors’ perception of the degree of political risk associated with locating 
capital in Israel. For most investors, the direct threat to property from the current level of violence is 
very small: the fraction of the Israeli capital stock destroyed as a result of Palestinian bombs (or for that 
matter IDF actions that result in the destruction of property) is very small. However, variations in the 
current level of violence could alter investors’ perceptions about the probability of a serious escalation 
in the conflict in the near future, in which either the rate of return to physical capital deteriorated 
5 Of course the consequences of the Intifada should be measured in terms of the ensuing human costs. The point of this 
paper is to show that these costs are not confined just to those suffering personal injury or loss of property as a result of 4
sharply, through a reduction in domestic demand, or capital was destroyed as a direct consequence of 
the violence. 
Some time-series indicators of attitudes and beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict already 
exist: for example, the TSC Peace Index (Yaar and Hermann, 2003). However, this and other indices 
do not exist for periods before 1994. Also, the structure of the permanent questions in these surveys is 
designed to elicit responses about a peaceful resolution of the conflict: for example, about whether 
people expect the peace process to succeed. Questions explicitly about feelings of personal insecurity 
have not featured regularly. Opinions about the likelihood of success for the peace process do not map 
straightforwardly onto opinions about levels of perceived risk. Some parties in Israel claim that an 
abandonment of the peace process and a more draconian policy with respect to the Palestinians would 
increase Israeli security in the long term.
6
In this paper we will restrict our attention to “objective” indicators of conflict intensity, that is, 
indicators that are not based on attitude surveys. We do not attempt to model the link between the 
objective indicators and attitudes, or between attitudes and capital flight. Rather we will fit a model that 
embodies both these links in reduced form, and estimate the relationship between the objective 
indicators and capital flight. 
Conflict intensity can be measured along a number of dimensions. First, one can measure the 
number of casualties in politically motivated violent incidents each quarter. Figure 1 shows the number 
of Israeli and Palestinian deaths from the beginning of the first Intifada (in 1987) up to the end of 
2001.
7 Both series exhibit a great deal of variability over the sample period. The most noticeable 
change is the large upsurge in violence associated with the beginning of the second Intifada in the last 
quarter of 2000; but this is by no means the only source of variation in the series. Both series together 
reflect the intensity with which the conflict is being pursued, although one possibility we will consider 
is that Israeli deaths have more impact on capital flight than Palestinian deaths, because most of the 
wealth is held by Israelis. 
  For a given level of violence, as indicated by total fatalities, there may be other factors that 
influence investors’ perception of risk. The current security policy of the Israeli administration might 
also make a difference. One crude way of capturing this is to use dummy variables for different 
political administrations over the sample period.
8 However, such dummies turn out not to capture any 
violent action by Israeli and Palestinian forces. Israel as a whole suffers from greater poverty. 
6 Questions relating to personal security do sometimes appear in the surveys, but not a regular or frequent enough basis 
to make use of them in a time-series model.  
7 All the political time series in the figures are provided by the Israeli human rights organisation B’Tselem. The general 
accuracy of the aggregate figures is not contested by other organisations such as the IDF, although interpretation and 
qualitative disaggregation of the series (for example into combatants and non-combatants) is highly controversial. We 
are using the latest estimates of the fatality statistics, which are periodically revised. However, using “real time” 
political data does not make any substantial difference to our econometric results. 
8 One could also include a dummy variable for the Gulf War. This is also statistically insignificant. 5
of the variation in the capital flight series discussed in section 3 below. One observable time-varying 
quantitative indicator of the severity of the government’s security measures is the number of days in 
each quarter when the border between Israel proper and the West Bank or Gaza is closed. (In fact it is 
very rare for one border to be closed and not the other.) For a given level of violence, an increase in 
the number of closure days might increase Israeli investors’ sense of security, because it is 
perceived that this will help to prevent future escalation in the conflict. On the other hand, an 
increase in closures might create the impression that the government is failing to contain Palestinian 
attacks, or that closures will provoke more violence in the future. So a priori the impact of closures 
on capital flight is uncertain. Figure 2 illustrates the closures time series. As with fatalities, the 
largest change is after the commencement of the second Intifada, after which the border has been 
closed virtually all the time. However, there are other periods in which the number of closures per 
quarter varies considerably. The frequency of border closures is not the only indicator by which the 
extensiveness of defensive Israeli security measures might be assessed. For example, qualitative 
indicators such as the intensity of government rhetoric might also matter. Nevertheless, we think 
that border closures are highly correlated with these more qualitative indicators, and so ought to 
work reasonably well as an overall indicator of the “toughness” of defensive Israeli security 
measures. Our main indicators of conflict intensity will be the fatality statistics (possibly 
disaggregated by nationality of the deceased) and the number of border closures. 
When we are looking at the impact of political conflict on economic variables such as 
capital flight, it makes sense to measure conflict intensity in terms of conflict outcomes, such as the 
variables discussed above. However, we also wish to look at the possibility of causality running in 
the opposite direction. When we are looking at the determinants of conflict intensity, it is not so 
obvious that the focus should just be on outcomes per se. The impact of economic conditions on the 
intensity of the conflict, if such an effect exists at all, will be through an effect on the propensity of 
each side to engage in aggression. These propensities cannot be observed directly, nor can they 
readily be identified from the fatality data. In order to illustrate this point we refer to Tables 1-2. 
The tables report some disaggregated statistics for fatalities during the second Intifada, i.e. 
the end of September 2000 to the present (end of November 2002). Table 1 disaggregates 
Palestinian fatalities according to whether the deceased was an adult, and whether (s)he died in an 
IDF assassination, or from other IDF gunfire, or from Israeli civilian gunfire.
9 Table 2 disaggregates 
Israeli fatalities according to whether the deceased was a member of the IDF, and whether (s)he 
died in a direct Palestinian assault (such as an ambush or bombing), or in other gunfire, or in some 
other way (such as stone-throwing). Some of these categories are readily identifiable as fatalities 
resulting directly from an aggressive action by the other side: for example, the IDF assassinations or  





















Figure 2: Number of Border Closure Days (Source: B’Tselem) 7
Table 1: The Total Number of Palestinian Fatalities During the Second Intifada
       Adults       Minors 
From IDF Assassination         124           ņņņņ
From other IDF Gunfire     1,197             299 
From Israeli Civilian Gunfire        22             3 
Source: B’Tselem (figures to the end of November 2002) 
Table 2: The Total Number of Israeli Fatalities During the Second Intifada
    IDF       Civilians 
From Palestinian Ambush/Bombing      99            364 
From other Palestinian Gunfire      98             86 
Other            12               22 
Source: IDF (figures to the end of November 2002) 
Palestinian bombings. But the majority of Palestinian fatalities and a large proportion of Israeli 
fatalities are in general fighting where it is not known with certainty – and is often hotly contested –
which side instigated the conflict. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish between combatants and 
non-combatants on each side. Most – but not all – of the Israeli civilians who died were unarmed at 
the time of the attack. The same can be said of most – but not all – of the Palestinian minors. How 
many of the Palestinian adult fatalities were combatants is also highly controversial: some, but 
certainly not all, were members of an armed militant group. 
For this reason, any workable time-series model that explains or predicts variations in the 
intensity of the conflict will be in some sense “reduced-form”. We will model the level of observed 
fatalities as a function of economic and political conditions, and interpret the results in terms of the 
impact of these conditions on the propensity of one or both sides to engage in aggression. However, 
such interpretation is necessarily speculative, since we do not observe “aggressiveness” directly. 
Section 4 below discusses the detail of the model incorporating the fatality and bordure 
closure time series. The next section discusses the way in which we measure capital flight. 
3. How Should Capital Flight be Measured? 
A number of recent papers (for example, Collier et al., 1999; Le and Zak, 2001) have pointed out 
that it makes sense to model international capital flows as a consequence of a portfolio choice by 
the representative investor. That is, capital flows result from changes in the proportion of investors’ 
stock of wealth made up by foreign assets. This argument applies equally to physical capital and to 
financial capital. Each period, domestic residents will make decisions about their preferred ratio of 
wealth in foreign assets to wealth in domestic assets. If this optimal ratio differs from the actual 
ratio, there will be some portfolio adjustment and a net capital inflow or outflow. 8
Figure 3 illustrates this concept for Israel. There are two quarterly time series in the figure; 
both represent the logarithm of an asset ratio. In each ratio the denominator is the same: the total net 
wealth of Israeli residents held in the form of domestic capital. This is measured as the total private 
sector Israeli capital stock (perpetually discounted private real domestic investment) less the 
fraction of this stock held by foreigners (perpetually discounted real net foreign direct investment in 
Israel). The numerator for the asset ratio F1 is the stock of foreign physical capital held by Israeli 
residents (perpetually discounted private real net foreign direct investment by Israelis abroad). For 
the asset ratio F2 it is the stock of foreign financial assets held by Israeli residents.
10, 11 The ratios F1
and F2 both have a positive trend over the sample period; that is, Israelis have been increasing the 
fraction of their wealth held abroad. Part of this trend might reflect increasing financial openness in 
the Israeli economy, but it might also be a consequence of trends in identifiable political or 
economic factors that have made Israel a less attractive place to invest. Over the Intifada period 
1987-2001 the average quarterly growth rate in F1 – the average rate of FDI capital flight as we 
measure it – is 2.68%. For F2 the figure is 3.56%. 
In the econometric analysis described in the following sections, we will make use of the 
portfolio share concept as illustrated by the asset ratios in Figure 3. Regression diagnostic statistics 
and information criteria suggest that the models we construct using the asset ratio approach are to 
be preferred to models based on deflated capital flows (such as real FDI by Israelis), and we will 
not report results for the latter. Nevertheless, the stylized facts that we infer from the asset ratio 
regressions also apply to the unreported capital flow regressions. 
  Before constructing an econometric model of capital flight, we should also look at evidence 
on the relative rates of return to domestic and foreign assets. One measure of the relative rate of 
return is depicted in Figure 4: the interest rate differential [i-i*-ds]. This is the difference between 
the domestic annualized three-month t-bill rate i and the corresponding US rate i*, controlling for 
the growth rate of the Sheqel-Dollar exchange rate ds. Most of the variance in this series is 
accounted for by movements in the exchange rate. As Figure 4 shows, there is considerable 
volatility in the interest rate differential, but as Table 3 below indicates the series is stationary. It 
also has a mean insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that there is interest parity between 
Israel and the USA in the medium/long term. There is no statistically significant risk premium in 
the t-bill interest rate differential. 
10 F2 measures gross foreign financial wealth; the general observations made about F2 are also mostly true of net 
foreign financial wealth. 
11 The capital depreciation rates and investment deflators for all Israeli FDI abroad are assumed to be the same as for the 
US private business sector. Appendix A gives more details about data sources and data construction. 9



















Figure 4: the Interest rate Differential [i-i*-ds]10
One explanation for the absence of a risk premium in such a differential is that financial 
assets with a three-month maturity are liquid enough for the political risk factor not to be important. 
Given that the current conflict falls short of a full civil war (in which the rate of return would be 
seriously compromised), investing in local financial capital is not particularly risky: three months is 
long enough to relocate one’s financial wealth offshore, if that becomes necessary. This suggests 
that we should focus on assets with less liquidity. It is not possible to disaggregate the financial 
asset ratio F2 according to time-to-maturity, so in the analysis that follows we restrict our attention 
to the physical capital ratio F1.
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4. The Model of Capital Flight
In the empirical model of capital flight we use quarterly time-series data, allowing the portfolio 
shares of domestic residents, as measured by our capital ratio F1, to vary with both political and 
economic factors. The construction of a complete structural econometric model of the Israeli 
economy is beyond the scope of this paper, and certain macroeconomic variables that impact on 
capital flight (such as the real exchange rate and the industrial wage) are not modeled: when these 
variables appear as regressors, they are instrumented by their own lagged values. Nevertheless, we 
will identify the impact of conflict intensity on capital flight, and of capital flight on conflict 
intensity, conditional on macroeconomic conditions. For the sake of clarity, it may be useful to note 
at the outset that we will find conflict intensity to be weakly (but not strictly) exogenous to capital 
flight. This section of the paper focuses on the capital flight equation. 
The first equation in our econometric model explains the share of capital wealth held in the 
form of physical capital abroad, F1. The economic variables entering into the F1 equation are as 
follows (sources are listed in Appendix A). 
(i)  The international interest rate differential, [i-i*-ds]. With instantaneous domestic capital 
market perfection the interest rate differential would capture all there is to know about 
the current relative rate of return to capital in Israel and the US. However, investors in 
physical capital will base their decisions on forward-looking expectations about future 
relative rates of return that may depend on other macroeconomic factors.
13, 14 Moreover, 
it is possible that there are differences between the marginal cost of capital and the 
12 We did try some regressions with F2 as the dependent variable; but these did not produce any robust relationship 
between the asset ratio and indicators of political risk. 
13 One could in principle test theories about alternative models of expectations (for example, Rational Expectations), by 
imposing cross-equation restrictions on the interest rate and capital flight equations that are presented below. However, 
our sample is quite small, so such tests of non-linear restrictions would not have a great deal of power. We prefer to 
remain agnostic about the nature of expectations formation, so we do not impose any such restrictions. 
14 The Bank of Israel does report some rates of return on bonds with a longer maturity. However, there are many such 
rates, none of which is reported consistently for the whole of the sample period. We were not able to construct a robust 
model of capital flight using any of these alternative measures.11
marginal return, at least in the short run. For this reason the model includes some other 
indicators of relative returns. 
(ii)  The first of these is the PPP real exchange rate, p/(s.p*). p is the retail price index for 
Israel, and p* the corresponding index for the USA. A larger value of the real exchange 
rate indicates a relatively high return to goods sold domestically. If some commodities 
are not internationally tradable, or at least if international transport costs are greater than 
zero, a larger value of p/(s.p*) ought to encourage capital to locate in the domestic 
economy rather than abroad.
15
(iii)  The second is the real industrial wage ratio, w/(s.w*). w is the Israeli index of industrial 
wages, and w* the corresponding US measure. A lower value of w/(s.w*) will be 
associated with relatively low labor costs, and ought to encourage capital to locate in the 
domestic economy rather than abroad. 
(iv)  Finally, there is the growth rate of output in the USA, 'ln(y*), and of output in Israel, 
'ln(y). With increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition, the rate of return to 
capital will depend on the overall level of economic activity in an economy (see for 
example Rama, 1993). Higher growth in the USA ought to encourage capital flight; 
higher domestic growth ought to discourage it. 
In addition to the economic variables, we include the following indicators associated with the level 
of violence and political instability. 
(i)  The total number of fatalities in violent political incidents in Israel in each quarter, D.
We anticipate that increases in the level of violence will intensify the perception that 
Israel is a risky place to invest, and so encourage capital to relocate abroad. It is possible 
to disaggregate D according to the nationality of the deceased (Palestinian, Israeli, 
other), their civilian / military status and the location of the incident (Israel, Gaza, West 
Bank). However, these disaggregations turn out not to have any explanatory power in 
the empirical model. 
(ii)  The total number of days in the quarter on which either the Israel-West Bank border or 
the Israel-Gaza border was closed, C. There are two potential reasons for the importance 
of this characteristic of the conflict. First, it might in itself be taken as an indicator of 
conflict intensity, so a rise in C is associated with greater capital flight. Alternatively, 
conditional on the level of D, higher values of C might reduce the perception of political 
risk in some investors’ minds  - because it is a quantifiable indicator of the “toughness” 
15 Some authors, for example Fedderke and Liu (2002) and Collier et al. (1999), use the real exchange rate (or the 
transformation advocated by Dollar, 1992) as a measure of macroeconomic imbalance. A higher level of the real 
exchange rate is presumed to be associated with greater macroeconomic risk and more capital flight. This interpretation 
turns out not to be that plausible in the case of Israel, since increases in p/(s.p*) are associated with less capital flight. 12
of the Government response to Palestinian insurgency - and so reduce the intensity of 
capital flight. Here, it is the investors’ subjective perceptions that matter; later on we will 
investigate what effect the border closures actually have on other conflict variables. 
(iii)  The commencement of the second Intifada at the end of September 2000 represents an 
enormous structural break in the intensity of the conflict. It is quite possible that the 
response of capital flight to conflict intensity exhibits some non-linearities, but we have 
only five observations for the period of the second Intifada (2000q4-2001q4), so such 
non-linearities are difficult to estimate with any precision. For this reason we include an 
intercept shift in the capital flight equation for the period after the onset of the second 
Intifada. The shift variable DUMt takes a value of unity for 2000q4-2001q4, and a value 
of zero otherwise. 
A number of existing papers using cross-section or panel data (for example Le and Zak, 2001) also 
include in their regression equation indicators of economic risk, such as measures of the variance of 
the domestic rate of return to capital. However, the economic variables in our time series data set do 
not exhibit any significant autoregressive heteroskedasticity: their conditional variance appears to 
be more or less constant over our sample period. For this reason we do not include any measures of 
economic risk in the model.
16
In the absence of any compelling a priori model structure, we use a regression equation 
around an unrestricted trend with the following functional form:
17
 a1(L)ln(F1)t = a2(L)[i-i*-ds]t + a3(L)ln(p/s.p*)t-1 + a4(L)ln(w/s.w*)t-1 + a5(L)'ln(y*)t             (1) 
+ a6(L)'ln(y)t + a7(L)ln(1+D)t + a8(L)ln(1+C)t + b0 + b1·t + b2·DUMt + Ht





air·xt-r, with the lag order n to be determined by an 
empirical information criterion. Logarithmic transformations are used to ensure that the variables 
are approximately normally distributed; (1+D) and (1+C) are used instead of D and C because these 
variables are occasionally equal to zero. In the tables reported below, the a6(L) parameters have 
been set to zero, as 'ln(y)t is never statistically significant in any regression equation. This makes 
no difference to the size or significance level of the other explanatory variables. 
  Table 3 reports ADF test statistics for the null that the variables of interest are difference 
stationary, against the alternative that they are stationary in levels, possibly around a deterministic 
16 One could perhaps include unconditional variance measures, but the theoretical grounds for doing so are dubious, and 
anyway such variables are not statistically significant when added to our regression equation. 
17 Note that contemporaneous values of the real exchange rate and the relative wage level do not appear in the 
regression. We do not want to assume that they are weakly exogenous to capital flight, and no convincing instrument 
(other than their own lagged values) is readily available. 13
linear trend. The table reports the sample size for each variable (the longest available, with the one 
exception noted below), the lag order of the ADF regression (chosen on the basis of the Schwartz 
Bayesian Information Criterion) and the p-value for the test of the null. Following Bierens (2002), 
who points out the magnitude of size and power distortions for the standard ADF test in small 
samples, this p-value is not taken from the standard tables. Instead we fit a model for each variable 
xt under the null: 
c(L)'xt = f0 + Kt                               (2) 
and use the i.i.d. residual Kt to create 10,000 bootstrap samples on which to run the ADF regression: 
c’(L)'xt = f’0 - f1·xt-1 + f2·t + K’t                           (3) 
Table 3: ADF Test Statistics 
variable       sample   lag  order   trend    p-value 
ln(F1)    83(1)-01(4)       0      yes      0.0184 
ln(F2)    83(1)-01(4)       6      yes      0.0006 
'ln(y)    83(1)-01(4)       1      no      0.0000 
'ln(y*)    83(1)-01(4)       1      no      0.0018 
ln(p/s.p*)    87(4)-01(4)       4      yes      0.0142 
ln(w/s.w*)    87(4)-01(4)       1      no      0.2746 
[i-i*-ds]    87(4)-01(4)       0      no      0.0000 
ln(1+D)    87(4)-00(3)       1      yes      0.0061 
ln(1+C)    87(4)-00(3)       1      no      0.0116 
The p-value indicates the fraction of bootstrap samples generating a value of f1 greater than that for 
the true sample. In all cases except ln(w/s.w*)t we can reject the null at the 2% level. In these tests 
we have fitted the equation for the conflict variables ln(1+D)t and ln(1+C)t up to 2000q3, before the 
onset of the second Intifada. Figures 1-2 above indicate a definite structural break in these series 
from 2000q4 onwards, but this is too close to the end of our sample for a Perron (1989) unit root 
test to be sensible. We proceed on the assumption that the conflict variables are stationary around a 
break in 2000q4. Equation 1 is fitted in levels, without recourse to an error-correction isomorphism. 
Note that we do not take differences of ln(w/s.w*)t, and the t-ratios on this variable should therefore 
be treated with some caution.
18
  Equation 1 cannot be estimated directly by OLS, because we cannot assume that the interest 
rate differential [i-i*-ds]t is weakly exogenous to the capital flight variable ln(F1)t. A larger capital 
outflow (i.e., a larger value of 'ln(F1)t) might push up domestic interest rates or lead to depreciation 
18 The Schwartz Bayesian and Akaike information criteria for the regressions below indicate that levels of ln(w/s.w*)t
are to be preferred to differences. 14
in the value of the Sheqel. Nevertheless, as noted above, we can reasonably assume long-run 
interest parity. In other words [i-i*-ds]t is independent of 'ln(F1)t in the long run. So we can 
identify the parameters of equation (1) by employing the method of Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
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where Zt is a vector of the other variables on the RHS of equation (1) and the u’s are reduced-form 
residuals, and assuming that Ht in equation (1) above is orthogonal to the innovation in the 
corresponding structural equation for [i-i*-ds]t, we can use the long-run independence restriction to 
recover the parameters in equation (1) from the parameters in the $ and % matrices.  
Table 4 reports the reduced-form parameter estimates for the ln(F1)t equation, along with 
corresponding standard errors and t-ratios. The lag order chosen on the basis of standard 
information criteria is 2. The quarterly sample runs from 1988 to 2001. The final column in the 
table shows the estimated coefficients in the structural equation (equation (1)). The diagnostic 
statistics in the table indicate that the coefficients are stable over time and robust to changes in 
sample size. This is confirmed by the recursive regression statistics shown in Figure 5.
19 In 
particular, there is no significant structural break during the Gulf War period (1990-91). Appendix 
B reports the corresponding [i-i*-ds]t equation; none of the coefficients on the political variables is 
significant in the structural equation for [i-i*-ds]t, so we do not discuss it at any length here. 
  These estimates are based on the assumption that the political conflict variables are weakly 
exogenous to capital flight. It seems reasonable to assume that the level of violence during period t 
is independent of the level of the capital stock at the end of that period. Nevertheless, section 5 of 
the paper will present a model of conflict intensity. Using this model, it is possible to test for weak 
exogeneity in the capital flight equation using the approach of Engle and Hendry (1993). This test 
will be discussed later. 
Table 4 shows that the coefficients on all of the explanatory economic variables take the 
expected sign, although the complexity of the dynamic response of ln(F1) varies from one variable 
to another. A larger differential between domestic and foreign interest rates discourages capital 
flight and lowers ln(F1), as does real exchange rate appreciation. An increase the in relative wage 
rate has the opposite effect. A higher rate of economic growth in the US also encourages capital 
flight. All of these effects are statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. Although 
there is some interaction between ln(F1) and [i-i*-ds], the reduced-form coefficients are not all that  
19 Each point plotted for a given quarter in the figure indicates the test statistic for a regression on a sub-sample ending 
in that quarter. The Chow Tests are for forecasts from the end of each sub-sample to 2001q4. 15
Table 4: The Regression Equation for ln(F1)  (1988(2)-2001(4)) 
The regression includes an intercept and trend. 
Variable     coeff.    s.e.  t ratio  h.c.s.e. ptl. R
2  ins.  str. co. 
ln(F1)-1      0.36112  0.15211   2.374  0.16773  0.1387  0.04    0.42552 
ln(F1)-2    -0.36322  0.15181  -2.393  0.15772  0.1406  0.04   -0.33882
[i-i*-ds]     ņņņņņņņ ņņņņņņņ ņņņņņ ņņņņņņņ ņņņņņņ ņņņņ -0.28414
[i-i*-ds]-1     -0.74027  0.29212  -2.534  0.29459  0.1550  0.09   -0.69695
[i-i*-ds]-2     0.22866  0.15196   1.505  0.13652  0.0608  0.13    0.22870 
ln(p/s.p*)-1     -0.23501  0.24286  -0.968  0.22209  0.0261  0.04   -0.27248
ln(p/s.p*)-2     -1.47350  0.28555  -5.160  0.24216  0.4321  0.04   -1.36790
ln(w/s.w*)-1     0.79851  0.20413   3.912  0.21863  0.3042  0.07    0.74585 
ln(w/s.w*)-2      0.10998  0.19697   0.558  0.16811  0.0088  0.08    0.10064 
'ln(y*)    4.11630  0.90216   4.563  0.98599  0.3730  0.09    3.64030 
'ln(y*)-1     1.50990  1.18070   1.279  1.38370  0.0446  0.06    1.18930 
'ln(y*)-2     3.31400  1.09000   3.040  0.93021  0.2089  0.20    3.49720 
ln(1+D)     0.02238  0.00965   2.320  0.01053  0.1333  0.04    0.02074 
ln(1+D)-1      0.01446  0.00888   1.629  0.00836  0.0705  0.04    0.01374 
ln(1+D)-2      0.03261  0.00873   3.734  0.00822  0.2849  0.04    0.02823 
ln(1+C)     -0.01440  0.00492  -2.923  0.00458  0.1963  0.04   -0.01464
ln(1+C)-1     0.00660  0.00564   1.170  0.00561  0.0377  0.06    0.00449 
ln(1+C)-2     -0.01861  0.00461  -4.042  0.00461  0.3182  0.16   -0.01523
DUM        0.12452  0.05110   2.437  0.04518  0.1451  0.03    0.11951 
h.c.s.e. = heteroskedasticity-corrected s.e.
ins. = Hansen (1992) parameter instability test statistic 
V = 0.03295  adjusted R
2 = 0.77440 
Hansen (1992) variance instability test statistic: 0.12952 
Hansen (1992) joint parameter instability test statistic: 3.66660 
LM test for residual autocorrelation: F(1,34) = 0.60929 [0.4405]
LM ARCH test: F(1,33) = 0.00099 [0.9751] 
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1 Chow Test statistics for forecasts to end of sample (as a fraction of the 5% c.v.)
Figure 5: Recursive Regression Statistics for the ln(F1) Equation 16
different in size from the structural coefficients. 
Moreover, increases in the level of political violence, as measured by the fatality variable D,
induce a higher level of capital flight, ceteris paribus. Some of this increase happens within the 
quarter in which the intensification of violence occurs, although the significance of coefficients on 
lagged levels of ln(1+D) suggests that sustained periods of high violence have a much greater 
impact on capital flight than short-lived spikes in ln(1+D). However, increases in ln(1+C) lead to a 
reduction in ln(F1). For a given level of violence, a more severe border closure policy seems to stem 
some of the capital flight. This suggests that investors perceive a more restrictive closure policy to 
be associated with greater security, perhaps in terms of the expected level of future violence. In 
section 5 below we will investigate whether such a perception is accurate.
The dummy variable for the second Intifada, last five quarters of the sample period, is also 
statistically significant. Capital flight has been over 10% higher than one might otherwise expect in 
this period, even taking into account the effect of fatalities and border closures. One explanation for 
this is that there are non-linearities in the effects of our conflict variables which cannot easily be 
estimated, because the period of greatest conflict happens just a few quarters from the end of our 
sample. However, it may also be that the effect of the dummy variable reflects general pessimism 
about the future stability of Israel stemming from increased hawkishness among leaders on both 
sides of the conflict, rather than the number of fatalities per se.
  How large are the effects of the political conflict variables, relative to those of the standard 
economic variables? Table 5 gives some insight into this question, reporting the values of the 
solved-out long-run coefficients on each of the conditioning variables in the VAR. These 
coefficients should be treated with some caution: we are not claiming that all of these conditioning 
variables are strictly exogenous, so the table does not necessarily indicate the asymptotic response 
of ln(F1) to shocks to each variable. Nevertheless, the table does indicate what would be the 
magnitude of the impact a of unit change in each conditioning variable in the long run with no 
feedback effects, and assuming that the other conditioning variables remain constant. Interpretation 
of these long-run coefficients makes more sense if we scale them by the sample standard deviation 
of the variable (around a trend); then we have a rough measure of the relative sizes of the long-run 
effects of “typical” changes in each of the conditioning variables. It turns out that these figures are 
roughly the same for each of the economic variables, a standard deviation change in each leading to 
a change in F1 of around 6-7%. This is also the size of the impact of a standard deviation change in 
ln(1+D). In other words, a typical change in the level of violence has about the same impact on 
capital flight as a typical change in the real exchange rate or relative wages. The size of the impact 
of a typical change in the border closures level is somewhat smaller (about 3%) but still substantial. 17
Table 5: Solved-Out Long-Run Elasticities: ln(F1) Equation 
         std.  dev.         coeff. ×
variable     around trend     coeff.      s.e.    std.dev.
ln(p/s.p*)    0.04391       -1.55650      0.23474    -0.0684 
ln(w/s.w*)        0.06345     0.87356     0.22986     0.0554 
'ln(y*)       0.00745     8.60260      1.65460     0.0641 
ln(1+D)       1.10186     0.07036      0.01411     0.0775 
ln(1+C)      1.43474    -0.02403      0.01057    -0.0293 
DUM       ņņņņņ    0.11351     0.06138    ņņņņņ
5. The Determinants of Conflict Intensity
Given that our measures of conflict intensity play such an important part in determining the level of 
capital flight, it is important to know whether variations in level of violence are entirely random, or 
whether they contain a deterministic, predictable component. There is a purely econometric reason 
for this exercise: to establish whether the level of violence is indeed weakly exogenous to capital 
flight. But also, the economic interpretation of the results presented in Tables 4-5 depends crucially 
on whether we think of changes in conflict intensity as strictly exogenous events that impact on the 
economic system, or whether there is some feedback from economic conditions to the level of 
violence.
  At this point we should admit a limitation to our analysis: there is very little data on 
macroeconomic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza. Annual aggregate price and GDP figures 
have been constructed for some years in the late 1990s; but there are no consistent data prior to the 
inception of the Palestinian National Authority, even at annual frequency. Moreover, data collection 
for 2001 onwards has been severely disrupted by the increased conflict intensity. The one variable 
that is available on a quarterly basis, and that might reflect changes in economic conditions in the 
West Bank and Gaza, is the closures variable C. On those days when the border is closed, there is 
effectively a high unemployment level in the Palestinian labor force.
20 We do have very detailed 
quarterly macroeconomic data for Israel proper, but Israeli output, inflation and unemployment 
series have no explanatory power in regression equations for our conflict intensity measures. So 
there is a concern that any econometric model of the level of violence will suffer from omitted 
variables bias. Having said this, the regression results we discuss below turn out to be robust to 
changes in sample size, and the parameters appear to be stable over time, so we have some 
confidence that we have captured the most important factors influencing the intensity of the 
conflict. 
20 Some PNA data on number of person-days lost through closures are available for the late 1990s; these figures are of 
course highly correlated with C. However, such data are not available for the whole of our sample period. Since much 
of the employment of Palestinians in Israel proper is in the informal sector, official Israeli labor force statistics are of 
little use here. 18
  Our conflict model embodies a combination of political and economic factors. First, we 
disaggregate total fatalities D according to the nationality of the victim, and construct two time 
series: ln(1+P) for Palestinian fatalities and ln(1+I) for Israeli fatalities.
21 We hypothesize that 
ln(1+P) and ln(1+I) depend on the following time-varying factors (the data sources are given in 
Appendix A). In each case, interpretation of an explanatory variable is subject to the caveats 
discussed in section 2 above. 
(i)  Each dependent variable’s own past value. Shocks to the intensity of the conflict may 
persist for several periods, if past Palestinian deaths encourage greater Palestinian 
militancy now (causing a higher level of fatalities on both sides), and if past Israeli 
deaths encourage a more hard-line approach by the Israeli authorities now (causing a 
higher level of fatalities on both sides). In the absence of appropriate instruments, we 
will not include the contemporaneous level of ln(1+I) in the ln(1+P) equation, nor of 
ln(1+P) in the ln(1+I) equation, which should therefore be interpreted as reduced-form 
representations.
(ii)  The number of border closures, ln(1+C), in previous quarters. The economic deprivation 
caused by closures might encourage greater Palestinian militancy, leading to conflict 
escalation. On the other hand, such deprivation might reduce some Palestinians’ capacity 
to engage in militant activity: effective militancy might depend on a certain minimum 
income level. 
(iii)  The lagged rate of growth of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, 'ln(B). If 
the rate of residential construction in the settlements increases, Palestinian militancy 
may also increase, leading to an increase in conflict intensity. 
(iv)  The lagged value of our FDI capital flight variable, ln(F1). It is possible that the 
opportunity cost of violent activity is greater when more of people’s physical capital is 
located in the conflict zone, and therefore at risk from Palestinian bombs or IDF 
bulldozers. If more capital is relocated abroad, perhaps because the current level of 
violence is higher, this may encourage even more violence in the future. In this case, it is 
the unconditional level of ln(F1) that matters, and there is the potential for a hysteresis 
effect.
(v)  The dummy variable for the second Intifada, DUM. We do not claim that the outbreak 
second Intifada can be explained in terms of the variations in variables (i-iv) above. 
Figure 1 above indicates that this represents are large structural break in the fatality 
series, due to political factors that cannot be quantified in a time-series model. A 
21 Greater disaggregation is possible, according to location and military status, but we have not been able to produce 
robust regression equations for more disaggregated series. In the analysis that follows we ignore the handful of fatalities 19
deterministic break in the intercept of the regression equations for 2000q4 onwards is 
required.
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where the vit represent shocks to the level of violence and Y is a vector made up of variables (ii-v) 
above.
Table 6 summarizes our results. In our estimate of the parameters in equation (5), we have 
selected a lag order of 2 for all variables except ln(F1) and 'ln(B), which are included with a lag 
order of 1; this minimizes the Schwartz Bayesian and Akaike information criteria. The diagnostic 
statistics in the table indicate that the coefficients are stable over time and robust to changes in 
sample size. This is confirmed by the recursive regression statistics shown in Figures 6-7. In both 
the ln(1+P) equation and the ln(1+I) equation, the dummy variable for the second Intifada is large 
and highly statistically significant, confirming the assumption that there is a deterministic break in 
the fatality series from 2000q4 onwards. 
The table shows that the current levels of Palestinian and Israel fatalities both depend on the 
past level of Israeli fatalities. Interestingly, however, both Palestinian and Israeli fatalities appear to 
be more or less independent of past Palestinian fatalities: the lags of ln(1+P) are not significant in 
either equation at conventional confidence levels. Ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in Israeli 
fatalities is associated with an increase in Palestinian fatalities of around 2.5% within the next two 
quarters. Starting from the log-mean levels of P and I (22 and 5½ deaths respectively), this means 
that one extra Israeli death is on average associated with approximately one subsequent Palestinian 
death. One interpretation of these results (although in the absence of a fully identified structural 
model this is only a conjecture) is that the intensity of Palestinian activity in the conflict – protests 
or attacks on Israeli targets that lead to both Palestinian and Israeli fatalities – is driven by factors 
other than the magnitude of recent Palestinian fatalities. In contrast, the past level of Israeli fatalities 
does appear to influence current conflict intensity, in terms of both Palestinian and Israeli fatalities. 
A possible reason for this is that a higher Israeli fatality level provokes a subsequent increase in the 
intensity of IDF engagement with the Palestinians. 
There are other factors that explain some of the variation in Palestinian fatalities, but that 
have no significant impact on Israeli fatalities. One of these is the rate of expansion of Jewish 
settlements in the Territories. A 10% increase in the rate of expansion is associated with a 
subsequent increase in Palestinian fatalities of about 5%. One interpretation of the result is that such 
of foreign nationals during the conflict. 20
Table 6: The Fatality Regression Equations 
Regression Equation for ln(1+P) (1988(2)-2001(4)) 
The regression includes an intercept and trend. 
variable  coeff.    s.e.  t ratio    h.c.s.e.  ptl. R
2  ins.  coeff. 2 
ln(1+P)-1  0.01927   0.12329    0.156  0.16428   0.0006   0.04  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+P)-2  -0.00150   0.11176   -0.013  0.14190   0.0000   0.05  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+I)-1  -0.02461   0.08020   -0.307  0.08620   0.0021   0.07  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+I)-2   0.26362   0.08002    3.294  0.11132   0.1979   0.03  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+C)-1  -0.13688   0.06162   -2.221  0.06797   0.1008   0.06  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+C)-2  -0.14381   0.06178   -2.328  0.05501   0.1096   0.05  ņņņņņņ
'ln(B)-1   0.51072   0.15643    3.265  0.14347   0.1950   0.13  ņņņņņņ
ln(F1)-1  4.37050   1.05170    4.156  1.25260   0.2818   0.04   2.9303 
DUM  3.29360   0.49845    6.608  0.59964   0.4981   0.01   3.4046 

h.c.s.e. = heteroskedasticity-corrected s.e.
ins. = Hansen (1992) parameter instability test statistic 
V = 0.49107  adjusted R
2 = 0.72902 
Hansen (1992) variance instability test statistic: 0.11691 
Hansen (1992) mean instability test statistic: 1.34241
LM residual autocorrelation test: F(1,43) = 0.09808 [0.7557]
LM ARCH test: F(1,42) = 2.00130 [0.1645]
      
Regression Equation for ln(1+I) (1988(2)-2001(4)) 
The regression includes an intercept and trend. 
variable   coeff.     s.e.  t ratio    h.c.s.e.  ptl. R
2  ins.  coeff. 2 
ln(1+I)-1  0.09294   0.13661    0.680  0.16548   0.0104   0.05  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+I)-2   0.36324   0.13629    2.665  0.15881   0.1390   0.05  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+P)-1  -0.27067   0.21000   -1.289  0.17538   0.0364   0.10  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+P)-2  -0.32559   0.19036   -1.710  0.17006   0.0623   0.09  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+C)-1  -0.07048   0.10495   -0.672  0.11580   0.0101   0.04  ņņņņņņ
ln(1+C)-2   0.00162   0.10523    0.015  0.12755   0.0000   0.09  ņņņņņņ
'ln(B)-1  -0.27420   0.26644   -1.029  0.22813   0.0235   0.09  ņņņņņņ
ln(F1)-1  5.31520   1.79140    2.967  1.39550   0.1667   0.08   6.0343 
DUM  3.57550   0.84900    4.211  0.57904   0.2873   0.03   2.2168 
h.c.s.e. = heteroskedasticity-corrected s.e.
ins. = Hansen (1992) parameter instability test statistic 
V = 0.83643  adjusted R
2 = 0.62909 
Hansen (1992) variance instability test statistic: 0.129174 
Hansen (1992) mean instability test statistic: 1.30387
LM residual autocorrelation test: F(1,43) = 0.56917 [0.4547]
LM ARCH test: F(1,42) = 0.07949 [0.7794] 21
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1 Chow Test statistics for forecasts to end of sample (as a fraction of the 5% c.v.)
Figure 6: Recursive Regression Statistics: ln(1+P) Equation 





2 one-step forecast errors (with 2 s.e. bars)




1 Chow Test statistics for forecasts to end of sample (as a fraction of the 5% c.v.)
Figure 7: Recursive Regression Statistics: ln(1+I) Equation 22










Figure 8: Recursive Estimates of the ln(F1)t-1 Coefficients (±2 Standard Errors) 
in the Fatality Regressions 
expansion provokes protest activity leading to more Palestinian deaths, but that it does not provoke 
significantly more attacks on Israeli targets per se. A second factor that affects the level of 
Palestinian fatalities is the number of border closure days in the quarter. A 10% increase in closures 
is accompanied by a Palestinian fatality level that is about 3% lower within the next two quarters. 
(The estimated impact on Israeli fatalities is also negative, but statistically insignificant.) One 
interpretation of this result is that the economic deprivation caused by border closures makes 
Palestinians less likely to engage in protests that lead to violent deaths, their greater sense of 
grievance being outweighed by the constraints of a lower income level. 
Finally, the lagged capital flight variable ln(F1) is highly significant in both equations. Both 
Palestinian and Israeli fatalities are higher after capital has relocated abroad. The estimated 
coefficients on this variable are 4.37 in the ln(1+P) equation and 5.32 in the ln(1+I) equation. The 
standard deviation of ln(F1) around trend is 0.094, so a one standard deviation increase in ln(F1) is 
associated with an increase in Palestinian fatalities of about 41% and in Israeli fatalities of about 
50% in the next quarter. This large effect is robust to changes in sample size, and to the exclusion of 
all other non-deterministic explanatory variables in the regressions. (Figure 8 depicts recursive 
estimates of the coefficient on ln(F1), and Table 6 includes the estimated coefficients on ln(F1) – 23
“coeff. 2” – when other variables are excluded from the regression.) It appears that the level of 
violence in any given quarter is highly sensitive to the location of domestic residents’ physical 
capital at the end of the previous quarter. The most straightforward explanation for this effect is that 
those engaged in conflict are more willing to escalate the level of violence when capital has been 
relocated abroad. For the reasons discussed in section 2 above, it is difficult to infer from the 
fatality data anything about the propensity of any one group to initiate a higher level of conflict; 
what we can say is that in aggregate, capital relocation impacts on the level of violence. 
A potential alternative explanation of the significance of the lagged capital flight term in the 
regression is that it embodies information about the future level of the conflict not contained in our 
measured variables. Perhaps investors have access to informal, non-quantifiable information that 
helps them to predict the future level of violence, and which also affects the volume of capital 
flight. If so, then the lagged residual from the Table 4 model should be a more appropriate 
explanatory variable than lagged capital flight itself. However, if this residual is added to the Table 
6 regressions it is statistically insignificant. 
Having fitted a model of fatality levels conditional on predetermined regressors, it is 
possible to construct a test of the weak exogeneity of the fatality variable ln(1+D) in the capital 
flight regression reported in Table 4. The fitted values of ln(1+P) and ln(1+I) can be combined to 
create a fitted time-series for ln(1+D). This series can then be added to the Table 4 regression 
equation. The t-ratio on this additional regressor constitutes a test of the null hypothesis that 
ln(1+D) is indeed weakly exogenous to ln(F1) (Engle and Hendry, 1993). The t-ratio in this case is 
–1.041, so the null cannot be rejected. 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Using quarterly macroeconomic data, we have shown that there is a strong association between 
Israeli investors’ decisions about where to locate their physical capital assets (inside or outside 
Israel) and the level of political violence arising from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Increases in 
conflict intensity – which appears to be weakly exogenous to the macroeconomic variables – lead to 
substantial capital flight: that is, Israeli investors increase the fraction of their physical assets 
located abroad. Moreover, capital flight in the current quarter leads to increased conflict intensity in 
subsequent quarters. These effects are both statistically significant and quantitatively important. The 
order of magnitude of the effects of the interaction of political and economic variables is at least as 
great as the “normal” economic interactions. 
  One consequence of this result is that any estimate of the economic costs of the Intifada that 
focuses solely on security expenditure and direct damage caused to property is likely to 
underestimate the true costs substantially. In order to put a precise figure on the costs associated 24
with capital flight, we need to estimate the marginal product of capital within Israel (relative to the 
international rate of return on financial capital), which is beyond the scope of the current paper. We 
suspect that local physical capital productivity is higher than the international return, because the 
political conflict discourages some types of investment at the margin, but the magnitude of the 
wedge is still to be estimated.  What we can say already is that even a small wedge between local 
capital productivity and the international return will imply a large value for conflict-related costs. 
  Even more striking is the sensitivity of the intensity of the conflict (as measured by the 
number of casualties of different kinds) to recent capital movements. Those engaged on one or both 
sides of the Intifada violence do appear to respond to changes in the opportunity cost of conflict 
escalation. So far, we have not found data that allow us to identify precisely how this opportunity 
cost impacts on the propensity of the combatants pro-actively to engage with the other side. All we 
can say is that there is a strong link between economic factors and the magnitude of the eventual 
conflict outcome, in terms of the number of casualties.25
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Appendix A: Data Sources and Data Construction 
variable construction 
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variable  definition (all variables are quarterly)        source 
G  rate of depreciation of private sector Israeli capital      BOI 
G* rate of depreciation of US business sector capital      FRED 
I net foreign direct investment in Israel (in Sheqels)      CBS 
I*   net foreign direct investment by Israelis (in Dollars)     CBS 
P Israeli private sector investment deflator (1995=100)    BOI 
P*    US business sector investment deflator (1995=100)      FRED 
Z net foreign portfolio investment by Israelis (in Dollars)    CBS 
K real (1995) private sector Israeli capital stock (in Sheqels)    BOI 
i three-month Israeli treasury bill interest rate       BOI 
i*   three-month US treasury bill interest rate        FRED 
s   Shequels  per  Dollar  spot  exchange  rate     BOI 
p Israeli consumer price index (1995=100)        CBS 
p*    US consumer price index (1995=100)        FRED 
w Israeli aggregate industrial wage index (1995=100)      CBS 
w*    US aggregate industrial wage index (1995=100)      FRED 
'ln(y)    rate of growth of real Israeli GDP          CBS 
'ln(y*)  rate of growth of real US  GDP          FRED 
D     total Intifada fatalities        B’Tselem 
P     Palestinian Intifada  fatalities       B’Tselem 
I Israeli Intifada  fatalities       B’Tselem 
C     number of days on which the Israel - West         B’Tselem 
Bank or Israel - Gaza border is closed 
'ln(B)   Rate of growth of number of residential buildings completed  CBS 
    in Jewish West Bank settlements in the previous quarter 
BOI = Bank of Israel; CBS = Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics; FRED = Federal Reserve Bank26
Appendix B: The Regression Equation for [i-i*-ds]  (1988(2)-2001(4)) 
The regression includes an intercept and trend. 
variable     coeff.    s.e.  t ratio  h.c.s.e. ptl. R
2   ins.  str. co. 
ln(F1)     ņņņņņņņ ņņņņņņņ ņņņņņ ņņņņņņņ ņņņņņņ ņņņņ -0.31186
ln(F1)-1      0.22663  0.13098   1.730  0.12467  0.0788  0.02    0.33925 
ln(F1)-2     0.08588  0.13073    0.657 0.13431 0.0122 0.02    -0.02740
[i-i*-ds]-1      0.15246  0.25156   0.606  0.24618  0.0104  0.16  -0.07841
[i-i*-ds]-2     0.00014  0.13086    0.001 0.13633 0.0000 0.09     0.07145 
ln(p/s.p*)-1     -0.13188  0.20914  -0.631  0.19272  0.0112  0.04   -0.20517
ln(p/s.p*)-2      0.37186  0.24590   1.512  0.27250  0.0613  0.03   -0.08767
ln(w/s.w*)-1     -0.18531  0.17578  -1.054  0.18900  0.0308  0.03    0.06371 
ln(w/s.w*)-2     -0.03288  0.16962  -0.194  0.17883  0.0011  0.06    0.00142 
'ln(y*)  -1.67540  0.77688    -2.157 0.79189 0.1173 0.04    -0.39171
'ln(y*)-1    -1.12840  1.01670  -1.110  1.12870  0.0340  0.11   -0.65751
'ln(y*)-2     0.64463  0.93864   0.687  0.89330  0.0133  0.07    1.67810 
ln(1+D)     -0.00579  0.00831  -0.697  0.00876  0.0137  0.03    0.00119 
ln(1+D)-1     -0.00253  0.00765  -0.331  0.00794  0.0031  0.02    0.00198 
ln(1+D)-2     -0.01541  0.00752  -2.049  0.00746  0.1071  0.03   -0.00524
ln(1+C)     -0.00086  0.00424  -0.203  0.00336  0.0012  0.08   -0.00535
ln(1+C)-1   -0.00740  0.00485    -1.525 0.00607 0.0623 0.07    -0.00535
ln(1+C)-2      0.01191  0.00397   3.004  0.00428  0.2050  0.06    0.00611 
DUM     -0.01763  0.04400  -0.401  0.03447  0.0046  0.01    0.02120 
V = 0.02838  adjusted R
2 = 0.78483 
Hansen (1992) variance instability test statistic: 0.45645 
Hansen (1992) mean instability test statistic: 3.24159
LM residual autocorrelation test: F(1,34) = 0.42920 [0.5168]
LM ARCH test: F(1,33) = 0.05744 [0.8121] 